# Enclosure
## INTERESTING MEMORIAL FROM THE TSUNG-LI YAMEN ON COAST DEFENCE.
The following translation of a memorial from the Tsung-li Yamen on the pressing necessity of coast defence and the need of quieting the dangers near at hand so as to guard well against those in the future is made by the N. C. Herald :
The Franco-Annamese question is somewhat different from the former Russian difficulty. Whether it is decided to preserve peace or to declare war; to act on the offensive or defensive, the dangers on the south-west will ever remain unchanged. When a foreign invasion is imminent, coast defence must not be for a moment forgotten. Annam and Kuangtung are connected with each other both by land and water, and troops have been ordered thither to guard (against any attack from the enemy). Military reports are now awaited from Peng Yu-lin and Chang Shu-sheng, and plans will be devised upon consulting them.
But let a review of the coast be taken. The Pai-yang (Northern Ocean) defence embraces Taku and Pei-tang and slightly watches over Lü Shan (Port Arthur); but the protection of Teng-lai is nil. The Nan-yang (Southern Ocean) defence includes the river and the sea with Kiang Yin as the strategical point, and guards Su Tai. As to Teng-lai, Ting Pao-chên in his Memorial considered Tengchow, Chefoo, and Wei-hai-wei as the essential points to be defended. The Governor of the Province (Shantung) however had erected only five forts in and near Teng Shêu Kau which are insufficient to well protect the coast.
The 800 marines under the Superintendence of the same Governor had been transferred by Li Hung-chang to the gunboats Chao-yung and Yang-wei of the Pei-yang squadron and whatever guns there are of the old pattern. When Wu Chang-ch'ing was instructed to organize the defence of that province, he had only a short time to act in and did not accomplish much. Now the inundation has come; our army and our funds are only capable of dealing with one point at a time and not sufficient to defend all the points at once.
Our Yamen has repeatedly been devising plans and methods of defence on behalf of that province. It is not necessary to increase the garrison of Tengchow, as there is a chên tai stationed there. Wei-hai-wei from its natural advantages is very defensible. But Chefoo with its broad expanse of sea, and level sandy coast, a haven for merchant vessels, has ever been exposed to and sought after by foreign vessels, and therefore a heavy garrison is needed for its protection.
As Wu Ta-ch'êng watches over Lan-lo and Wu Chang-ch'ing is placed in Korea, they cannot be spared from their posts. The Throne is petitioned to instruct the Pei-yang Superintendent to select an able commander who will take with him trained soldiers from four to six camps and hold Chefoo. When Chefoo is secure, then both Lü Shan and Ka Tang will be safe.
The most important of the coast defence undertaken by Tso Tsung-tang is Po-mao Shan. The strait of Po-mao is situated 70 li east of the Chou Chi mouth and is the receptacle of the sea-flowing rivers of Soochow and Changchow. In the time of the Ming dynasty alarms were communicated by means of smoke signals at Po-mao to warn the people of a Japanese invasion.
The sea outside the strait is broad, and steamers pass and re-pass in it. The natural dangers of the place can be judiciously employed to make its defence effectual. The sea ports of Liu Ho, Ta-chien Fou, Hsü-liu Ching and others, through which the Capital of Kiangsu can be reached, are away from the Metropolitan city over a hundred li and are nevertheless to be defended.
Tsung-ming, an isolated island in the sea, relies solely on the chên-piao who commands but a weak garrison. If an alarm of war is sounded the isle is difficult for reinforcements to reach; every precaution for protecting the place should then be prepared beforehand.
The organization of the fishing brigade in the southern provinces is indeed an admirable idea; it prevents spies in the inland waters and can assist in harassing the enemy along the sea-coast. But fishing brigades may only be able to protect the people (in cases of need); they are of no avail in a battle.
The defence of Kiangsu needs more funds than can be spared; and if a tax is collected and militia instituted, people will ever be kept in a state of alarm and doubt. Therefore the Throne is petitioned to command the Fatai of Kiangsu, under the head of Winter Defence, to pick able-bodied men from the six or seven districts along the coast and class them in divisions of 300 each.
They are to be given rifles and ammunition and trained stuff year from three to five months in winter and spring; they will be able to handle their arms well and be thoroughly disciplined in that time. In peace they may detain and arrest salt-smugglers; in war they can patrol the sea-ports. In carrying this plan into execution, the funds will not be wasted, people will not be disturbed, and the many districts close to each other will rest in security.
The salt smugglers along the shores of the T'ai Hu who appear and disappear at intervals are doing a great deal of harm to the community and interfere with the organization of coast defence. It is imperative to crush any rebellious project on their part in the bud; then no danger will be apprehended from them at the rear when fighting an enemy in front.
Let the Throne instruct the Fatai of the province to collect volunteer boats that they may capture these desperadoes and change them into loyal subjects; then land, sea, and lakes, (freed of them) may become tranquil.
The coast of the Min province is washed by the Che-yang (Chêkiang Ocean) and at the furthest end by the Canton sea. The government of this province requires an able official as the ever vigilant watching (for an opportunity to attack China) must be guarded against.
If the high authorities of the province consider tranquillity, and able rule, and not intent on devising plans for defence, at the first stir of the ocean's waves (war) Formosa, Peng-hu, and Amoy will be untenable. It is prayed that the Throne will bestow some thought on the province of Min either in appointing some able officials or decreeing some old generals to govern and protect it.
The isolated isle of Ting-hai, the port of Cha-pu, Ningpo, and Chou-shan in the province must be placed under the strictest surveillance. Some time ago a Decree was promulgated ordering Lin Ping-chang to take charge of the coast defence, who from his experience in war affairs will be able to bring it to an effectual state, and Your Majesties may rest at ease on that point.
Another matter, however, must be brought to the Imperial notice. The coast defence was instituted about ten years ago; the money expended on purchasing guns and ships amounted to tens of millions, and yet in case of war nothing can be relied on; the preparation for defence against Russian invasion cost the outlay over ten millions, and still the coasts are in a disorderly state.
The provincial authorities shirk their responsibility by complaining of the niggardliness of the Boards, while the officials of the Boards in turn fail in their duty by charging the provincial authorities with indulging in extravagant expenses. The dilly-dallying, the waste of time and opportunity, are all due to the faults of our Yamen.
Even if the judgment of not censuring us, we cannot fool ourselves on the question of coast defence. The Yamen considers the protection of trade and defence of the coast to be two points of essential importance. The coast defence being in an unworthy state, it is not likely that trade will flourish.
From this time forward let the coast defence be ever kept up in an efficient condition. The preparation which exists against the threats of the French today will be improved upon for defending the coast in the future. After receiving a Decree in reply to this Memorial, our Yamen will diligently study the naturally defensible points of the coast and the new invention of foreign gunboats, consulting with the Board of Revenue with regard to funds, with the Board of War in regard to tactics and military affairs, and with provincial authorities on procuring able commanders.
When the country can remain at peace (without dishonour) or go to war (with confidence) then our reputation for being powerful will be established, and rebellious projects will be stifled. When preparation (for coast defence) begins, then danger ceases.
Page 333
**An unpublished decree from the Empress is also sent to us, but it contains nothing of importance beyond an expression of opinion on the part of Her Majesty that the schemes of the French are "wily and insatiable."—ED.**
Page 420
Enclosure
INTERESTING MEMORIAL FROM THE TSUNG-LI YAMEN ON COAST DEFENCE.
or
The following translation of a memorial from the Tsung-li Yamin on the pressing necessity of coast defence and the need of quieting the dan- gers near at band so as to guard well against those in the future is made by the N. C. Herald :--- The Franco-Annamese question is somewhat different from the former Russian diffealty. Whether it is decided to preserve peuce or to declare war; to act on the offensive defensive, the dangers ou the south-west will ever remain unchanged. When a foreign inve sion is imminent, coast defence must not be for a moment forgotten. Annam and Kuangtung are connected with each other both by land and water, and troops have been ordered thither to guard (against any attack from the enemy). Mi itary reports are now awaited from Peng Yu-lin and Chang Shu-sheng, and plans will be devised upon consulting them. But let a review of the coast be taken. The Pai-yang (Northern Ocean) de- fence embraces Taku and Pei-tang and slightly watches over La Shan (Port Arthur); bat the protection of Têng-lai is mil. The Nan-yang (Southern Ocean) defense includes the river and the sea with Kiang Ying as the strategical point, and guards Su Tai As to Tông lai, Ting Pao-chên in hs Memorial considered Têngehow, Chefoo, and Wei-hai-wel as the essential points to be defended, Tan overnor of the Province (Shantau) however had eroated only five forts in and near Tang Shêu Kau which are insufficient to well protect the noast The 800 marines under the Superintendence of the sama Governor had been transferred by Li Hung-obaue to the gunboats Chao-yung and Yang-wei of the Pei-yang squadron and whatever guus there are of the old pattern. When Wu Chang-ch'ing WRS instructed to OE- ganize the defence of that province, he had only a short time to act in ad did not accomplish mach, Now the inundation has coms; our army and our fands are only capable of dealing with one point at a time and not sufficient to defend all the points at once. Our Yawen has repeatedly been devising plans and methods of defauea of b half of that province. It is not necessary to increase the garrison of Tengohow, as there is a chên tai stationed there. Wei-bai.wo from its natural advantages is very defensible. But Che- foo with its broad expanse of sea, and level shady coast, thente for merchant vessels, has ever been exp.. to and sought after by foreig vers, and trafore a heavy garrison is newded, for its protection. As Wa Ta-ch'êng watcliss over Lan-lo and Wu Chang.on'ing placed in Kores, they cannot be spared from thair posts. The Throne is petitioned to instruct the Pei- yang Superintendent to select an able comman. : der who will take with him trained soldiers from four to six camps and hold Chefoo. When Che. foo is secure, then both Lu Shan and Ka Tang will be safe. The most important of the coast defence undertaken by Tso Chuur.tang is Po. mao Sba. The strait of Po-m- ir itaated 70 east of the Chou Chi wrist and is the receptacle of the sea.fi- !! rivers of Soochow and Changolow.
the time
of the Ming dynasty alar. mmunicated y means of smoke were assa at Po-mao to warn the people of a Japanese invasion. The sea out- side the strait is broad, and steamers pass sad re- pass in it. The natural dangers of the place oan be judiciously employed to make its defenor effeo- tual. The sea ports of Liu Ho, Ta-chien Fou, Hsü liu Ching and others, through which the Capital of Kiangsu can be reached, are away from the Metropolitan city over a hundred li and are nevertheloss to be defended. Tsung- ming, an isolated island in the sea, ralios solely on the chen-piuo who commands but a weak garrison. If an alarm of war he sounded the isle is difficult for enforcements to reach; every precaution of protecting the place then should he prepared be forehand. The organization of the fishing brigade in the southern provinces is indeed an admirable idea; it prevents spies in the inland waters and can assist in harassing the enemy along the sun-coast. But fishing brigades may only be able to protect the people (in cases of need); they are of no avail in a battle. The defence of Kiangsu reads more funds that can be spared; and if a tax is collect. ed and militia instituted, people will ever be kept in a state of alarm and doubt. Therefore the
Throne
Throne is petitioned to command the Fatai of Kiangsu, nuder the hoad of Winter Defence, to pick able-bodied men from the six or seven dis- triots along the coast and class them in divisions of 300 each. They are to be given rifles and ammunition and trained STUFF year from three to five months in winter and spring; they will be able to handle their arms well and be thoroughly disciplined in that time. In peace they may detest and arrest salt-smugglers; in war they can patrol the sea-ports. In carrying this plan into execution, the funds will not be wasted, people will not be disturbed, and the many districts close to each othor will rest in security. The salt smugglers along the shores of the 'T'ai Ha who appear and disappear at intervals are doing a great deal of harm to the community and interfere with the organization of coast defence. It is imperative to orush any rebellious project on their part in the bad; then no danger will be apprehended from them at the rear whon fighting an enemy io front. Let the Throne iostract the Fatai of the provines to collect volunteer boats that they may capture these desperadoes and chan 'e them into loyal subjects; then land, sea, and laken, (freed of them) may become tranquil. The coast of the Min province is washed by the Che-yang (Chakiang Ocean) and at the fur- thest end by the Canton sea. The govern. ment of this province requires an able official as the ever vigilant watching (for an opportunity to attack Chins) must be guarded against. If the high authorities of the province consider tranquillity, and able rule, and not intent on devising plans for defence, at the first stir of the ocean's waves (war) Formosa, Peng Chou, and Amoy will be untenable. It is prayed that the Throbe will bestow some thought on the provines of Min either in appointing some abla officials or decreeing some old generala to govers and protoct; it. The isolated isle of Ting-bai, the port of Cha-pu, Ning- po, and Chou-hai in the province must be placed under the strictest surveillance. Some- time ago a Decren was promulgated ordering Lin Ping-ohane to take charge of the coast defence, who from his experience in war affairs will be able to bring it to an effectual state, and Your Majesties may rest at ease on that point. An- other matter, however, must be brought to the Imperial notice. The const defence was institat. ed about ton years ago; the money expended on purchasing guns and ships amounted to teus of millions, and yet in case of war nothing can be relied on; the preparation for defence against Russiau invasion cost the outry over ten mil. lious, and still the coasts are in a disorderly state. The provincial authorities shirk their responsi. bility by complaining of the niggardliness of the Boards, while the officials of the Boards in turn fail in their duty by charging the provincial authorities with indulging in extravagant ex- penses. The dilly-dallying, the ste of time and opportunity, are all due to the feelts of our Yamen, Even if the judgment of not censure us, we cannot fool >
ase on the question of coast defence. The Xamon con- siders the protection of trans and defence of the coast to be two pouta of essential importance. The coast defeuss being in an unworthy state, it is not likely that trade will flourish. From this time forward let the coast defence be ever kept up in an efficient condi- tion. The preparation which exists against the threats of the French today will be improved upon for defending the coast in the future. After receiving a Deeroe in reply to this Memorial, our Yamen will diligently stady the naturally defensible points of the coast and the new invention of foreign gunboats, esulting with the Bart of il-venne ith regard to funds, with the Board of War in regard to tactics and military affairs, aud with provin sial authorities on procaring able commanders, When the country can remain at peace (without diahonour) or go to war (with confidence) then our reputation for being powerful will be es tablished, and rebellious projects will be stified. When preparation (for coast defence) begins, then danger ceases.
333 does
**An unpublished decree from the Emprase is also sent to us, but it contains nothing of importan ce bayond an expression of opinion on the part of Har Majesty that the schemes of the French are "* wily and insatiable.”—ED.
420
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